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Stewart, Chater and Brown’s (2006) decision-by-sampling 
theory proposes that people make decisions about everyday 
events by drawing samples of “similar” events from memory 
and comparing them to the event in question. Classic gains-
versus-losses framing effects emerge naturally from the 
theory, along with a number of other decision-making 
phenomena. In this paper, we note that since these biases are 
treated as memory-related, and there are empirically 
observed individual differences in both memory and 
susceptibility to bias, the two might be expected to be 
related. Specifically, better memory should reduce 
overconfidence but, somewhat counterintuitively, strengthen 
framing effects. To test this, we measured working and 
retrieval memory for 60 undergraduates, and compared these 
to their susceptibility to each bias. Although the data 
collected displayed the usual decision-making effects, no 
relationship was found between memory and either bias once 
covariates were controlled for. 
 
Keywords: decision making; bias; cognitive processes; 
overconfidence; framing. 
 
The idea that people make decisions by sampling 
information from the environment or memory has a long 
history in cognitive science, having been applied to visual 
perception (Vickers, 1979), memory (Ratcliff, 1978) and 
categorization (Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997) among other 
things, and remains the dominant explanation for various 
phenomena associated with decision times (see Luce, 
1986). More recent papers have developed sampling-based 
explanations of classic judgment and decision-making 
behavior (e.g., Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Lee & 
Cummins 2002; Stewart, Chater & Brown, 2006). Stewart 
et al (2006), in particular, propose a specific sampling 
approach (which, perhaps confusingly, they just call 
“decision-by-sampling”, or DbS) that explains gain-versus-
loss framing effects and hyperbolic intertemporal 
discounting curves by reference to the underlying 
environmental/memory structure from which samples are 
drawn, in a manner that is loosely consistent with 
Anderson’s (1990) rational approach to cognition.  
In this paper, we note that, within the DbS framework, 
there are two quite different methods by which biases can 
be produced, and from which experimental predictions can 
be obtained. We then present results that suggest that, when 
cast in a strong form that incorporates individual 
differences, predictions consistent with DbS are not met. 
 
Two Kinds of Bias 
Framing: A Distributional Bias. Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) proposed that subjective value functions relating an 
objective value to a psychological prospect are non-linear, 
with two key properties. The first is the decreasing utility of 
both losses and gains – that is, as monetary values increase 
in size, their value to a person does not increase in the same 
linear fashion. To take a simple example, winning $1 
million would make an enormous difference to the lives of 
most people but the changes resulting from winning $2 
million are not twice as great. Their second observation 
was that, for most people, loss functions are steeper than 
gain functions. That is, a loss of $x is worse than a gain of 
$x is good. Thus, losses weigh more heavily in people’s 
minds.  
As a consequence of these properties, people can show 
preference reversals when an option is described in terms 
of a gain, as opposed to in terms of a loss: people are risk-
seeking for losses, but risk-averse for gains. This can be 
seen in Figure 1, which shows the typical pattern of 
subjective value functions: steeper for losses than gains and 
decreasing utility. So a gain of $100, due to decreasing 
utility, is not twice as valuable as a gain of $50. In contrast, 
a $100 loss is not twice as bad as a $50 loss and so a 50% 
chance of a $100 loss is better than a certain $50 loss. This 
effect has been repeatedly shown across monetary amounts 
and across domains as dissimilar as oil spill cleanup 
options (Pieters, 2004). 
DbS proposes an explanation for this effect that does not 
require explicit value functions. Instead, to evaluate an 
option, people draw a decision sample of values from 
memory of “similar” options. The current value is then 
ranked within the decision sample to determine its relative 
value amongst these, as illustrated in Figure 2. The impact 
of the real world on the process is in determining the 
distribution of losses or gains from which the decision 
sample for any particular judgment is generated; that is, the 
values that have been seen in similar contexts to the current 
judgment. Stewart et al (2006) present data suggesting that 
in everyday experience, people tend to gain money in large 
chunks (e.g., paychecks) but lose money in smaller chunks 
(e.g., buying coffee). The key point is that the cumulative 
distributions produce shapes similar to prospect curves, but 
it is worth noting that if framing does rely on real-world 
distributions, it might explain why the framing effect does 
not always replicate when using questions about goods 
other than money (Rönnlund, Karlsson, Laggnäs, Larsson, 
& Lindström, 2005; Wang, 1996). If the distributions of 
losses and gains for goods of these types differ from those 
for money, decision samples drawn from these might well 
lead to effects that differ from the classic framing effect.  
DbS thus proposes that framing exists “in the 
distributions”. Now, since the shape of the rank function is 
embedded in a real world distribution, it will be estimated 
much more accurately by larger samples: the gains versus 
losses distinction will appear sharper as more samples are 
collected. In short, the framing effect should be stronger 
when the decision sample is larger. 
Overconfidence: A Sampling Bias. The overconfidence 
bias is the tendency to overestimate the accuracy of 
judgments (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982). 
Typically, when asked to provide a rating of their own 
performance or some analogue of a confidence interval, 
people tend to show more confidence than is warranted. 
Although Stewart et al (2006) do not discuss the 
application of DbS to confidence, sampling-based 
approaches have frequently been applied to confidence 
ratings (e.g., Vickers 1979, Merkle & Van Zandt 2006). 
For the current purposes, we are interested in the estimation 
of confidence intervals, which are commonly used in 
applied settings.  
If decisions are made using a sample drawn from 
memory, it seems likely that any confidence range is 
estimated from the statistics of this sample. However, since 
small samples consistently underestimate the variability in 
the distribution, decisions based on simple sample statistics 
(the core proposal in DbS) will naturally produce 
overconfident predictions, an effect expected to be 
strongest when the decision sample is small. 
Predicting Individual Differences 
Motivated by the applied problem of needing to explain 
individual differences in cognitive bias, we develop a test 
of a slightly extended version of DbS. In the previous 
discussion we briefly outlined how DbS accounts for the 
shape of the value function for a particular person. A 
logical extension of DbS would propose that variability in 
memory processes should be reflected in a corresponding 
variability in the strength of framing and overconfidence 
effects. That is, people with better memories should be able 
to draw larger decision samples, leading to decreased 
overconfidence but increased susceptibility to framing. 
This implication, though not explicitly made by Stewart et 
al. (2006), follows naturally from the theory. Of course, as 
Stewart et al. (2006) note, there are a range of other factors 
that can alter the size and composition of the decision 
sample. As a result, the empirical question of whether 
individual differences in sampling from memory are strong 
enough to produce individual differences in cognitive bias 
(as per the extended DbS theory) is an open one, and one of 
considerable applied value.  Accordingly, it is this extended 




Sixty undergraduate psychology students at the University 
of Adelaide (15 males and 45 females), aged from 18 to 28 
(M = 19.6, SD = 2.1) participated for course credit. 
Materials 
Risky-Choice Framing Tasks. Ten purpose-designed, 
self-report risky-choice framing tasks modeled on Tversky 
and Kahneman’s (1981) study were used to measure 
framing susceptibility. The task involved five pairs of 
questions, each with a different type of ‘good’ at stake: 
human lives, money, objects, animals or communities. 
While the cover story varied between members of the same 
pair, the type of goods and numerical outcomes of the 
options remained the same. This enabled a within-subjects 
manipulation where a participant saw different questions 
regarding the same type of goods in both positive and 
negative frame conditions. A framing effect was assumed 
to occur if participants switched their preference between 
equivalent questions in the negative and positive versions. 
However, such a manipulation confounds the cover story 
with the framing effect, so half of the participants saw the 
same set of questions, with the framing reversed in all ten 
cases (see Table 1). This allows both simple tests that the 
different versions of the cover stories are not the source of 
any effect and a more sophisticated approach in which 
effects of frame and version are disambiguated, along with 
any interactions, using mixed models (discussed later). 
Figure 1: An example of a subjective value function, 





Figure 2: Utility of $40 evaluated against example 
decision samples of monetary gains and losses. 
Overconfidence. A 20-item questionnaire was used to 
assess overconfidence, modeled on Capen’s (1976) 
approach, requiring participants to set confidence intervals 
(an elicitation method common in the oil and gas industry). 
Items were trivia questions such as “How many countries 
are there in Europe?”; participants providing a low and 
high guess (i.e., a range) in which they were 90% confident 
the actual answer lay. If such ranges are well-calibrated, 
then the number of ranges including the true answer should 
follow a Binomial(20,0.9) distribution. Additionally, in 
order to obtain confidence ratings as well as confidence 
intervals, participants indicated how knowledgeable they 
felt about the item on a 3-point scale: hard (“absolutely no 
idea”), medium (“had a vague idea”) and easy (“I felt that 
I knew”). 
Memory. Human memory is not homogeneous, and 
although Stewart et al (2006) do not comment on which 
processes may be involved in the construction of a decision 
sample, it seems clear that working memory (Miller, 1956) 
and retrieval fluency (Mather & Woodcock, 2001) should 
play a role – that is, the abilities to retrieve items from long 
term store and to hold them in mind for comparison. 
Accordingly, retrieval fluency was measured via Test 12 of 
the Woodcock-Johnson III (Woodcock, McGrew, & 
Mather, 2001), and working memory capacity was 
measured via the Backward Digit Span task of the Digit 
Span subtest from the WMS-III (Wechsler, 1997).  
Intelligence. Previous findings also indicate that 
individuals with higher intelligence are less susceptible to 
framing (Stanovich & West, 1998) and overconfidence 
(Pallier et al., 2002) and, given that performance on tests of 
mental ability (including memory) tend to correlate (Deary, 
2001), tests of fluid (Gf) and crystallized (Gc) intelligence 
were included as covariate controls to ensure that any 
observed effect was due to differences in memory. Bors 
and Stokes’ (1998) short form of Raven, Court and Raven’s 
(1988a) Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM) was used 
as an indicator of Gf, while the Senior Form 1 of The Mill 
Hill Vocabulary Scale  (Raven, Court, & Raven, 1988b) 
was used for Gc.  
Procedure  
The sample was divided into two groups (Group 1 and 
Group 2). Each participant received a single questionnaire 
composed of all the aforementioned tests other than the two 
memory measures, and one version of the risky-choice 
framing tasks (see Table 1). The order in which the 
measures were presented in each questionnaire was 
random, excepting that the risky-choice framing tasks were 
always separated by other measures (or instructions to see 
the researcher to complete a memory task).  
Results 
Framing Effects. As seen in Table 2, for each of the 10 
framing questions, the proportion of participants selecting 
the risky option was greater when the question was 
negatively framed – a result that a sign test indicates is 
significant, p<.001. Across the whole data set, then, the 
framing effect is clearly apparent. However, as noted 
earlier, the study used a combination of within and between 
subjects conditions (with correlated frame and version 
assignments, as a matter of necessity) to allow a more 
detailed analysis to be conducted. Data in this format are 
efficiently handled using generalized estimating equations 
(GEEs; Liang & Zeger, 1986) to estimate the relevant 
marginal effects within the standard general linear model. 
Results are shown in Table 3.  
The significance levels for the frame effects tended to be 
reasonable to good, ranging from p = .24 in the worst case 
to p < .001 in the best. In their own right, however, only the 
Table 3: Model effects estimated via GEE methods, for 
five risky-choice framing task pairs. 
 
Scenario  Wald χ2(1) p 
Human Frame (F) 2.24 0.14 
 Version (V) 3.89 0.05 
 F × V 0.12 0.73 
Money Frame (F) 12.82 <.001 
 Version (V) 12.82 <.001 
 F × V 0.43 0.51 
Object Frame (F) 1.37 0.24 
 Version (V) 1.37 0.24 
 F × V 0.01 0.94 
Animal Frame (F) 9.79 <.01 
 Version (V) 0.02 0.88 
 F × V 3.13 0.08 
Community Frame (F) 2.32 0.13 
 Version (V) 0.26 0.61 
 F × V 0.00 >.99 
Note. Bold indicates significant effect at the .05 level. N = 60.  
Table 1. Framing of questions by group. 
 
Question 1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b 4a 4b 5a 5b 
Group 1 + – + – + – + – + – 
Group 2 – + – + – + – + – + 
 
Table 2: Percentage of participants choosing the 
‘risky option’ on positive and negative framing tasks. 
 
Scenario  % Positive % Negative 
Human Life Nuclear Accident 46.7 53.3 
 Building Collapse 56.7 70.0 
Money Insurance _6.7 33.3 
 Investment 33.3 63.3 
Objects Manuscripts 16.7 23.3 
 Statues 23.3 30.0 
Animal Cattle  13.3 56.7 
 Penguins 23.3 36.7 
Community Villages 43.3 53.3 
 Towns 40.0 50.0 
 
“money” and “animal” scenarios reached standard levels of 
significance. A much more varied pattern exists for the 
cover stories (with p ranging from < .001 to .88), 
suggesting that some story-pairs may have been equivalent, 
but not all. Fortunately, however, none of the interaction 
effects were significant, with only the “animal” case being 
borderline (at p = .08). As a result, the effect of cover story 
can safely be disambiguated from the effect of frame, and 
the initial analysis suggesting an overall significant effect 
of frame is supported.  
Framing and Memory. Overall susceptibility to framing 
was measured in terms of a “framing score” - the number 
of framing effects (preference reversals consistent with 
prospect theory) that a participant displayed. Higher 
framing scores therefore denote increased susceptibility to 
framing. The mean framing score obtained was 1.27 (SD = 
1.19) out of 5. In total, 71.7% of participants reversed their 
preference at least once. The mean score on the backward 
Digit Span subtest from the WMS-III was 6.98 (SD = 2.20) 
and, on Retrieval Fluency, from the Woodcock-Johnson III, 
78.15 (SD = 17.43). 
Turning to the predicted correlation, participants who 
performed better on the two memory measures displayed 
no more framing effects than did participants with poorer 
memories. In fact, there was a weak tendency for higher 
backward digit span scores to be associated with less 
susceptibility to the framing effect (ρ = –.31, p<.05; see 
Table 4), a significant effect in the direction opposite to that 
predicted by our extension of DbS. Controlling for possible 
impacts of the intelligence measures – Ravens APM and 
Mill-Hill – and retrieval fluency did not noticeably affect 
this correlation, which remained at –.29. The correlation 
between framing score and retrieval fluency, was non-
significant, weak and negative (ρ = –.13); the trend once 
again opposite in direction to our predictions. In this case, 
however, controlling for intelligence and digit span 
eliminated the trend, with ρ  weakening to –.03. 
Although this correlational analysis has the desirable 
characteristic of looking at the entire data set, and is 
designed to minimize the risk of false positives, it may be 
that – as discussed earlier – the memory effect exists for 
some types of question (e.g., money, for which Stewart et 
al. (2006) provided explicit distributions) but not others 
(e.g., community gains and losses, whose environmental 
distributions are unknown). With that in mind, we also 
conducted a finer grained analysis, which of course carries 
a much higher risk of false positives. To test the hypothesis 
of domain-specific memory effects on framing, 
independent samples t-tests were conducted, comparing the 
mean memory performance for people who showed 
prospect-theory consistent framing and those who showed 
no preference reversal. Across the 10 tests (5 domains x 2 
memory measures) only two cases were significant at the 
two-tailed .05 level: people showing the framing effects for 
the community question had better retrieval fluency (t(33) 
= 2.11, p = .04), whereas working memory was lower 
among those who showed the effect for objects (t(46) = –
2.06, p = .04). Obviously, if we make any reasonable 
correction for the inflation of false-positive errors caused 
by testing 10 hypotheses, both cases become non-
significant. Overall, these results are unconvincing, with no 
evidence of any consistent relationship between individual 
differences in memory and framing susceptibility. 
Overconfidence. We now consider the confidence data. As 
shown in Figure 3, perfectly calibrated individuals would 
be expected to average 18 hits out of 20 in our task, with 
the actual number following a binomial distribution with 
rate 0.9 and sample size 20. However, while the binomial 
model predicts that 95.7% of people should score in the 16-
20 range, not one of our 60 participants did so. Not 
surprisingly, a single sample t-test of the hypothesis that the 
data arise from a distribution with mean 18 is highly 
significant, with t(59) = –26.79, p<.001. In short, 
participants were highly overconfident. Indeed, the average 
score of 8.8 out of 20 (SD = 2.66) implies that the ranges 
given were (on average) 44% intervals rather than 90% 
intervals.  
Examining the data more closely, of the 1200 responses 
to items on the overconfidence test, participants rated a 
question as “easy” 252 times. Of these, 206 (81.8%) of the 
90% ranges provided contained the actual answer, CI98.3 = 
[75.9, 87.6]. Of the 389 times participants rated a question 
as being of “medium” difficulty, 169 (42%) ranges 
contained the actual answer CI.98.3 = [35.9, 47.9]. Finally, 
Table 4: Spearman correlations between cognitive 
measures, framing and overconfidence scores.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 B. Digit Span .24 .16 –.02 –.31* –.19
2 Ret. Fluency .45 ** –.01 –.13 –.14
3. Mill-Hill .17 –.27* –.31*
4 Ravens –.13 –.21
5 Framing .21
6 Overconf. 
Note: * = sig. at the .05 level.** = sig. at the .001 level. 
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 Figure 3: Participants’ expected and observed 
scores on the 90% confidence calibration task. 
just 183 (32.7%) of the ranges participants gave for the 559 
items they rated as “hard” contained the true answer CI98.3 
= [28.0, 37.5]. Since none of the three 98.3% confidence 
intervals1 contained the value 90 (though the “easy” case is 
close), we conclude that participants were overconfident in 
each case (p<.05). Note, however, that the confidence 
interval for the “easy” questions in Figure 4 does not 
overlap the intervals calculated from the “medium” and 
“hard” items, indicating that the level of overconfidence in 
this case differs from the others. Visual inspection shows 
overconfidence increasing with difficulty, replicating the 
standard hard-easy effect for confidence calibration. 
Memory and Overconfidence. To relate memory 
measures to overconfidence, a miscalibration level (the 
“overconfidence score”) was calculated by taking the 
discrepancy between each participant’s raw score, and the 
expected level of performance of 18/20.  As shown in 
Table 4, the data display non-significant correlations in  the 
predicted direction between backward digit span and the 
overconfidence score (ρ = –.19) and between retrieval 
fluency and the overconfidence score (ρ = –.14). However, 
Table 4 also shows that crystallized intelligence correlates 
significantly with the overconfidence score (ρ = –.31). 
With both intelligence measures and retrieval fluency 
controlled for, the relationship between backward digit 
span weakened to ρ = –.08, while in the case of retrieval 
fluency, controlling for intelligence and working memory 
measures caused the trend to reverse direction (ρ  =  .17), 
though it remained non-significant. Thus, overall, the 
evidence does not support our DbS-inspired prediction that 
memory would mediate overconfidence. 
Discussion 
The results of this study offer no support for our extension 
of decision-by-sampling (DbS) theory: although the study 
reproduced other predicted effects (within- and between- 
subject framing, overconfidence, hard-easy effects, 
correlations between biases and intelligence), it uncovered 
no systematic relationships between memory and bias. In 
particular, it should be noted that a previously 
demonstrated (Koriat, Ma’ayan & Nussinson, 2006) 
relationship between overconfidence and retrieval was not 
replicated – due perhaps to the use of a different measure of 
overconfidence than the earlier research. 
Some further caveats require mention. Firstly, the 
strength of the framing effect might be questioned. Only 
two of the five question pairs showed significant effects in 
their own right, perhaps resulting from the within-subjects 
design: traditional framing experiments use only between 
subjects designs (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), though 
these designs have a more serious flaw, in that they cannot 
determine which participants are susceptible.    
Unlike the memory measures, the intelligence measures 
                                                          
1 In these analyses 98.3% confidence intervals were reported to 
ensure that the joint probability that all three values lay within 
the intervals remained at 95%. 
 
did correlate with bias, in line with previous research 
(Stanovich and West, 1998). In particular, that participants 
with high crystallized intelligence are less overconfident is 
consistent with the results of Pallier et al. (2002) and with 
the hard-easy effect: participants with high crystallized 
intelligence will find more items on an overconfidence test 
‘easy’ and thus produce more accurate ranges, leading to 
less overconfidence overall.  
Finally, it should be noted that most of the correlations 
observed are weak, with only the Mill-Hill measure of 
crystallized intelligence having consistently significant 
correlations with the measures of bias susceptibility.  This 
may reflect no more than a truncation in range resulting 
from a sample comprised entirely of undergraduate 




Although this initial study does not support our extension 
of the DbS approach to include individual differences, it is 
important to recognize that what it rules out are only the 
strongest claims that the theory might encompass. In 
particular, although we did not find the predicted 
relationships between memory and decision-making 
between people, this is by no means the only interesting 
approach that DbS allows. The current study placed no 
controls on how participants made decisions; it sought to 
use individual differences to find the predicted effect. 
While this is appealing since it makes the decisions more 
“naturalistic” and is useful from an applied perspective 
(e.g., for debiasing), it necessarily loses some degree of 
experimental control. Since the effects do not emerge under 
“ordinary” circumstances, it makes sense to consider 
within-person effects, using artificial methods like response 
deadlining and imposing cognitive load to influence the 
decision sample.  
The absence of strong effects also suggests other 
approaches: for instance, it may be that the measures of 
memory were not well chosen. Working memory capacity 
and fluency of retrieval were selected as they seemed, 
logically, to play the roles described for memory in DbS. 
However, they are not the only possibilities, so others 
might be worth considering. Along somewhat different 
 
Figure 4: 98.3% confidence intervals for the ‘easy,’ 
‘medium’ and ‘hard’ items on the overconfidence test. 
lines, another test of DbS might examine the choice of 
reference class when making decisions – that is, the 
population from which samples are drawn. This could be 
tested by teaching people specific distributions of losses 
and gains before presenting a set of framing tasks. It could 
be determined whether this manipulation of the decision 
sample affects the decision made. Such a direct test is 
required given the absence of knowledge regarding the 
environmental distribution of losses and gains for most of 
the types of goods used in framing tasks – which would be 
required in order to predict, a priori, how people will react 
to changes in framing. In the absence of such knowledge it 
is, in many cases, impossible to determine whether it is the 
presence or absence of framing effects in a specific study 
that would support DbS. 
In conclusion, the current failure to validate the theory 
rules out only our extension of the theory. It may be that 
DbS-related effects are strong enough to be observable 
across decisions made by a given person, but not so strong 
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